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Summary findings
Incidence studies of fiscal policy in developing countries  Philippines - can be estimated using a variety of data
typically examine either the distribution  of tax burdens  sources and tools, using simplifying assumptions.
or the incidence of public expenditures. But the central  For 20 years, the Philippine economy has experienced a
issue for policymakers is the combined or net incidence  series of balance of payments crises triggered by fiscal
of fiscal activities.  crises. It has had an unsatisfactory record of poverty
Even if a tax is regressive, the impact of increasing  alleviation.  As the government tries to maintain fiscal
it may not be, if the revenue raised is spent in a  discipline by raising taxes and cutting spending, how will
progressive manner.  But even if the beneficiaries of  poverty be affected?  Devarajan and Hossain examine net
public spending are the poor, the net effect may not  fiscal incidence to find out. Their findings:
be pro-poor,  if the  spending is financed by a highly  * The incidence pattern of taxes is basically neutral.
regressive tax.  Contrary to expectations, indirect taxes are only slightly
One reason that combined incidence studies are so  regressive. The poor consume taxed goods such as
rare: they require detailed data on both taxation and  energy directly, but the rich consume them indirectly by
public spending. Most analysts consider themselves lucky  purchasing goods the production  of which requires
if they have data on either.  energy and other taxed goods.
Devarajan and Hossain show that the net incidence of  *  It is the pattern of expenditures that drives the
fiscal policy in a country with average data - the  combined incidence, which is progressive.
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Studies of the incidence of fiscal policy in developing countries typically examine either the
distribution of tax burdens (e.g., Almad  and Stern 1989, Shah and Whalley 1991), or the incidence of
public expenditures (e.g., Meerman 1978, Selowsky 1979, van de Walle and Nead 1995 ).  Yet the central
issue for policymakers is the combined or net incidence of fiscal policy.  For even if a tax is regressive,
the overall impact of increasing it may not be, if the revenue raised is spent in a progressive manner.
Conversely, while the beneficiaries of  public spending may be the poor, if this spending is financed by a
highly regressive tax, the net effect may not be pro-poor.
One reason why combined fiscal incidence studies are so rare is that they require detailed data on
both taxation and public expenditures.  Most analysts consider themselves fortunate if they have data on
either.  The purpose of this paper is to show that the net incidence of fiscal policy in a country with
average data -- the Philippines -- can be estimated using a variety of data sources and tools.  Needless to
say, we make numerous simplifying -- some would say heroic -- assumptions, draw on different data
sources and put the available tools to creative use.  Nevertheless, a fairly robust picture of the net
incidence of taxes and expenditures in the Philippines  emerges.  Furthermore, the pattern of incidence that
we find has important imnplications  for Philippine economic  policy.  During the past 20 years, the
Philippines has been characterized by a series of balance of payments crises, triggered by fiscal crises, and
an unsatisfactory record of poverty alleviation. As the government attempts to maintain fiscal discipline by
Iraising  taxes  and cutting  expenditures,  how will  poverty  be affected? The answer  lies in the net incidence
of fiscal  policy  in the Philippines,  which is the subject  of this paper.
Section  II of the paper  provides  a brief overview  of the different  methods  we use to estimate  the
combined  incidence  of taxes  and expenditures  in the Philippines. Section  III presents  our results. Section
IV contains  some concluding  remarks.
II.  Methodology
The analysis  of tax incidence  captures  the effects  of both  direct and indirect  taxes. Direct  taxes
include  income  and business  taxes,  while  indirect  taxes  encompass  excise, import  tariffs, and value  added
taxes  (VAT). The analysis  of expenditure  incidence  captures  three major  categories  that have significant
distributional  implications  in the Philippines:  infrastructure,  health, and education.
Tax Incidence
Direct  Taxes
Since, like  many  developing  countries,  the Philippines  has low collection  rates, this paper
considers  the effective  tax rate--tax  revenue  divided  by the base--as  opposed  to statutory  rates.
Accordingly,  the Bureau  of Internal  Revenue's  (BIR)  actual tax collections  for 1988  and 1989  by gross
income  bracket form the basis  for our tax incidence  analysis. To map income  classes  into  deciles,  we use
the 1988  Family  Income  and Expenditure  Survey  (FIES),  which  gives the number  of families  in each
income  class, albeit  at a coarser  degree  of disaggregation  than we use herein.
Indirect Taxes
We examine  two effects  of indirect  taxes.  The first is the "cascading,"  or interindustry,  effect.
For example,  an excise  tax on oil gets passed  on to all users of oil, so that consumers  of goods  whose
production  uses oil end up paying  part of the tax. The second  indirect  effect is the impact  of a tax on the
price of substitutes  for the taxed good. For instance,  an import  tariff raises the price of import  substitutes.
Thus, consuners of the substitute  good suffer  a drop in their real income  from the price increase,  even
2though they are not paying any of the original tax.  For incidence analysis, these two effects of indirect
taxes can be important and often dominate the effects of direct taxes.  We incorporate both in our analysis
by undertaking a general-equilibrium analysis of indirect taxation. It is noteworthy that the second type of
indirect tax effect--the impact of a tax on the price of substitute goods--does not entail a payment by
consumers to the government; rather, the payment will be the higher prices paid by consumers to
producers of substitute goods.  As a result, the incidence of a tax calculated with this method reflects both
actual tax collections and the increased costs associated with each tax.
Expenditure Incidence
Here we focus on three expenditure categories that have significant distributional implications in
the Philippines: infrastructure, health, and education.  There are at least two distinct ways to measure the
incidence of public expenditures (for a survey, see Selden and Wasylenko, 1991).  One, known as
"expenditure incidence studies," examines how government expenditures increase the income of different
individuals in the economy (schoolteachers, doctors, construction workers, and so forth) and then
determines where in the income distribution these people lie.  The other approach, called "benefit
incidence," considers the services provided by public expenditures--education,  health care, infrastructure,
etc.  --and examines how different income classes, or deciles, use these services.  This was the approach
adopted in the pioneering studies of Meerman (1979) and Selowsky (1979).  This paper adopts the benefit
incidence approach as well.
Given the dearth of data on the access of households  to the public services supported by these
expenditures, we apply an indirect method for obtaining the incidence of public spending:  we look at the
regional pattern of expenditures which, combined with information on income distribution within each
region, yields inferences about the nationwide incidence pattern.'
We use the 1988  FIES to apply  income  intervals  corresponding  to the national  deciles  to the population  of each
region,  and thus obtain  the percentage  of households  in each of the intervals.  We then assume  that the benefits  from
public  expenditures  in a region  are distributed  unifornly. In part, this assumption  is justified  by the idea that  many
infrastructure  projects  yield  a public-good  whose  benefit  is shared  equally  by everyone.
3We use access  data as indicators  of the incidence  of expenditures  for education  and health. For
education  expenditures,  we use primary  and secondary  school  enrollment  rates; for health  expenditures,
we use hospital  and clinic  utilization  rates.
m. Results  and Discussion
Taxes
Direct  Taxes
Income  taxes. According  to a recent study, the income  tax collection  rate in the Philippines  is
very low; only about  50 percent  of potential  income  taxes  are collected  (World  Bank 1992). Thus, while
the statutory  rates reflect  a progressive  tax, the effective  rates may not. Table 1 shows  the Bureau  of
Internal  Revenue's  estimate  of actual  tax collections  for 1988  and 1989  by gross-income  bracket. The
effective  tax rates (the ratio of tax payments  to gross income)  rise quite steeply  with income. However,
Table 1 breaks  taxpayers  down  by income  classes  (or brackets)  rather than  by deciles. Quite  simply,  the
number  of households  in each income  class  is by no means  the same. Table 3 maps income  classes  into
deciles  based on FIES 1988,  which  gives  the number  of families  in each income  class. The resulting
effective  tax rates by decile  are shown  in columns  2 and 3 of Table 3.  The apparent  progressivity  of the
income  tax is dampened  when  expressed  in terms  of deciles  rather than  income  brackets. The reason for
that effect is that the income  classes  that pay the highest  tax rates (more  than 10  percent)  comprise  only a
small  fraction  of the Philippine  population. They  are averaged  in with those who  pay lower  tax rates when
we consider  the highest  decile  of the population. The effective  tax rates by decile  can be compared  with
Manasan's  (1990)  estimates  of the potential  income  tax rates  by decile  (Table  3, column  4).  While  the
potential  tax rates are significantly  higher,  the degree  of progressivity  is not much  greater. In the
Philippines,  tax avoidance  and evasion  are evidently  largely  the  province  of the rich. Hence, if the
government  increased  its efforts  at tax collection,  it would  surely improve  the income  distribution  in the
country,  as well  as provide  much  needed  revenue.
4Table 1.  Tax Collection  by Gross-Income  Categories
(in pesos)
1 9fRR  19g9
No. of  Effect  No. of
Tax-  Gross  Exemp-  Taxable  ive  Tax-  Gross  Exemp-  Taxable  Tax due  Effect Income bracket  payers  income  tions  income  Tax due  tax  payers  income  tions  income  ive
rate  tax
rate
<2,000  6254  3229  109171  772  3256277
2-4,000  6304  19759  98356  5696  25366
4-6,000  10488  53750  163899  6236  38759  84384
6-8,000  13522  96405  208156
8-10,000  20215  185178  314371  4834  43979  63767
10-12,000  28120  314656  427063  12721  6672  74147  87753  3444
12-15,000  57858  790663  871423  102227  252  0  18088  248573  228047  46033  124  0.00
15-20,000  176658  3182259  2827056  694240  8182  0  55960  997771  720888  315053  3799  0.00
20-30,000  467742  11682920  6502209  5226095  174117  0.01  243338  6212767  3165338  3052704  105959  0.02
30-50,000  631727  23398588  9689531  13717110  745889  0.03  503884  19374077  7653536  11721181  663108  0.03
50-60,000  121143  6634433  1949900  4685558  366938  0.06  103172  5628882  1610709  4018292  316101  0.06
60-100,000  226617  17039643  3814455  13226838  1363581  0.08  199072  15166830  3361214  11805708  1227191  0.08
100-150,000  55348  6269432  932587  5336862  726944  0.12  70561  8499899  1208477  7291422  1038354  0.12
150-180,000  27319  3925195  470567  3454628  547069  0.14  17139  2803319  297025  2506294  424550  0.15
180-200,000  18454  3278093  321037  2957055  519161  0.16  7294  1382144  128455  1253689  225574  0.16
200-300,000  16235  3870904  280835  3590068  696432  0.18  15003  3559561  265840  3293721  637610  0.18
300-500,000  6681  2482116  112790  2369325  534610  0.22  5438  2015638  94192  1921445  433096  0.21
500-1,000,000  2710  1803318  44157  1759160  472679  0.26  1635  1022483  27308  995125  262016  0.26
>1,000,000  994  3394419  15731  3378688  1130033  0.33  253  992210  4246  987964  332422  0.34
Source: Bureau of Internal Revenue.
5Table 2.  Effective Tax Rates by Income Class
(in pesos)
1  QR8  1  989_
Income  Number of  Average  Gross  Tax due  Effective  Average  Gross  Tax due  Effective
class  families  income  income  tax rate  income  income  tax rate
<6,000  179240  44625  7998585  0  0  49351  8845635  0  0
6-10,000  632703  8254  5222330  0  0  9128  5775375  0  0
10-15,000  14183339  12640  17927804  252  0  13979  19826359  124  0
15-20,000  1412363  17467  24669744  8182  0  19317  27282270  3799  0
20-30,000  2265258  24629  55791039  174117  0.003  27237  61699310  105959  0.002
30-40,000  1382995  34694  47981628  372944  0.008  38368  53062882  331554  0.006
40-60,000  1476584  48749  71981993  739882  0.010  53912  79604886  647655  0.008
60-100,000  1109936  75385  83672525  1363581  0.016  83368  92533445  1227191  0.013
> 100,000  656509  179092  1.2E+08  4626928  0.039  198058  1.3E+08  3353622  0.026
Source:  FIES, Bureau  of Internal  Revenue.
6Table 3.  Effective Tax Rates by Decile
(tax paid as a share of gross income)
Decile  1989  1988  1987  Potential
I  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
II  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
III  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
IV  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.000
V  0.002  0.003  0.003  0.000
VI  0.004  0.006  0.004  0.000
VII  0.008  0.010  0.006  0.002
VIII  0.008  0.010  0.009  0.006
IX  0.010  0.012  0.019  0.031
X  0.018  0.025  0.033  0.094
Source: Columnns  2 and  3: authors' calculations;  column  4: Manasan  (1990).
Other estimates  of income  tax progressivity  in the Philippines  largely stratify the population by income
class (Yoingco 1989 and Corcoran 1991).  Not surprisingly, they reveal much higher effective tax rates for
the  top income bracket (around 7 percent),  but for  the reasons discussed earlier they  are not directly
comparable with the preceding estimates.
Business taxes. The incidence of effective business tax rates is estimated in a manner analogous to
income taxes.  We use the FIES data to map the BIR's tax collections  by income bracket into taxes paid by
deciles (Table 4).  We then compute the effective tax rates by decile (Table 5).  Note that while the pattern
of effective tax rates is quite progressive, the levels are extremely low.  Even the richest 10 percent of the
population  pay less than two-tenths of 1 percent of their income in business taxes.  There appears to be a fair
amount of room for increasing business tax collections, which will in turn be equity-improving.
7Table 4.  Effective Tax Rates on Business Income by Income Class
1989
Income  bracket  Number  of  Gross  Exemptions  Taxable  Tax due  Effective
taxpayers  income  income  tax rate
<2,000  155390  477  2958551
2-4,000  676  2126  12418
4-8,000  2154  13165  40074
8-10,000  1207  11258  23760
10-12,000  1383  15662  26395  313
12-15,000  1818  25059  35495  1102  3  0.00
15-20,000  3220  57396  63695  5596  60  0.00
20-30,000  7244  182901  117732  66025  1907  0.01
30-50,000  16406  644139  262479  381660  21448  0.03
50-60,000  4655  254345  72658  181686  14233  0.06
60-100,000  9853  765578  160718  604859  64212  0.08
100-150,000  4882  590693  80223  510460  73127  0.12
150-180,000  1421  233099  23007  210092  35750  0.15
180-200,000  658  124808  10805  114003  20566  0.16
200-300,000  1621  387737  26025  361712  70354  0.18
300-500,000  757  283504  12057  271447  61441  0.22
500-1,000,000  216  135615  3402  132213  34874  0.26
> 1,000,000  46  139358  655  138702  46115  0.33
8Table 5.  Incidence of Business Taxes













The Philippine  government  relies on indirect  taxes for about 70 percent of its revenue.  This fact alone
explains why the tax system has been considered regressive.  Since they are levied on transactions, indirect
taxes  can hurt the poor more than they do the rich,  insofar as the former spend a larger fraction of their
income than the latter.  Furthermore, it is felt that some individual  taxes in the Philippines--the excise tax on
oil, for example--are particularly regressive because the poor spend a larger share of their income on them
than do the rich.
As pointed  out earlier, we must examine the effects of each tax on prices to determine the incidence
of indirect  taxes  in the Philippines.  We do so by simulating  the removal of each type of tax with a multisector,
computable  general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Philippine economy (Go 1991).2 The model solves for
market-clearing  prices and quantities  that are consistent with the individual  optimizing behavior of consumers
and producers, a given set of world prices, and the policy environment.  Four features of the model are worth
bearing  in mind when interpreting the results.  First,  the model captures the fact that, in the Philippines,
2 For an early  attempt  at using  a CGE  model  for tax-incidence  analysis,  see Devarajan  et al. (1981). Shah  and
Whalley  (1992)  note  that  general-equilibrium  tax incidence  studies  of developing  countries  have been  somewhat  rare,
although  Habito  (1984)  and Mitra and Tendulkar  (1987)  are notable  exceptions.
9imports  and domestic  goods in the same sector are imperfect substitutes. Therefore, when a 10 percent tariff
is removed, the domestic price of the substitute drops by less than 10 percent.  The implication is that the
effective  tax rate paid by consumers of food, say, is somewhat less than the tariff rate on food.  Second, the
model includes interindustry ("cascading") transactions through the input-output table.  Thus, an excise tax
on oil, for example, ends up being a tax not just on final energy consumption, but also on other final goods
that use oil at some stage in their production. This will have important implications for the burden of indirect
taxation. Third, the tax rates that are used in the model are effective tax rates--that is, the actual revenue from
a tax divided by its base.  In this way, our calculations are consistent with those for direct taxes.  Fourth, in
simulating the removal of individual indirect taxes, we assume they are replaced by an income tax that
preserves  government  revenue.  Thus, we are examining the "true" price-distorting effects of the tax, rather
than combining them with those generated by macroeconomic imbalances.  In order to make the calculation
of the indirect-tax burden comparable with that of direct taxes, we add to the burden induced by the price-
distortions  the proportional income tax required to preserve government revenue. Since the income tax is
proportional, it does not distort the pattern of indirect-tax incidence.
Having simulated  the price effects of eliminating a particular tax, we examine how much of income
each household  income class spends  on the different commodities (Table 6).  The expenditure pattern is based
on the FIES.  When combined  with the price changes, the pattern determines the change in purchasing power
induced  by  each tax for  each income class.  This is the effective direct  and  indirect tax paid by  the
representative household.
10Table 6.  Household Expenditure  Shares by Income Class
Total  <:6,000  6-10,000  10-15,000  15-20,000  20-30,000  30-40,000  40-60,000  60-100,000  > 100,000
Food  50.7  66.7  67.3  65.6  63.2  60.0  56.2  51.9  45.8  35.8
Alcohol  1.1  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.1  0.8
Tobacco  2.1  1.9  2.0  2.5  2.7  2.8  2.7  2.3  1.8  1.2
Fuel, light,  water  5.2  7.9  6.9  6.4  6.1  5.6  5.2  5.1  5.0  4.7
Transportation-  4.7  2.1  2.3  2.6  2.8  3.2  3.5  4.1  4.7  7.9 Comunication
Household  2.5  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.2  2.1  2.0  2.2  2.6  3.2 operations
Personal  care  3.3  1.8  2.3  2.7  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.3
Clothes,  FTW  4.2  2.5  3.2  3.8  4.1  4.4  4.5  4.5  4.4  3.9
Education  2.9  0.5  0.8  1.0  1.4  1.6  2.2  3.0  4.0  4.1
Recreation  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.8
Medical  1.7  1.6  1.2  1.3  1.5  1.4  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.9
Nondurable  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4 furniture
Durable  1.8  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.8  1.6  1.9  2.6  2.9 furniture
Rent  11.7  8.0  6.8  6.5  6.6  7.9  9.0  11.0  13  18.2
Maintenance  1.1  0.7  0.7  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.3  1.1
Taxes  1.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.5  1.0  3.1
Miscellaneous  3.3  1.3  1.6  1.9  2.5  2.7  3.3  3.3  3.7  4.1
Other  1.8  0.3  0.3  0.5  0.6  0.8  1.3  1.8  2.6  2.8
Total  100.1  99.9  99.8  100.3  100.1  99.8  99.9  99.9  99.8  100.2
Source:  FIES
11Excise taxes.  The first part of Table 7 presents the initial effective rates ("partial equilibrium") and
the model-simulated rates ("general equilibrium") of the excise tax in the Philippines.  The partial effects
reflect the commonly  accepted  incidence  pattern. Excise taxes of this nature are generally regressive, although
other studies  have found that the recent adaptations in the petroleum product tax rates have been sufficient  to
make the direct effect of these taxes progressive (Yoingco 1992). The general-equilibrium rate for utilities
(fuel, electricity,  and water) is three times higher than the partial-equilibrium one--due to the cascading effect
mentioned earlier.  Furthermore, while the excise tax is levied directly only on a few sectors, the general-
equilibrium simulation reveals that the price of all sectors is affected by the tax.  Again, this is due to the
interindustry transactions captured by the model.
When  these  price  changes are mapped  into expenditure shares, the resulting burden is mildly
progressive when the tax is computed as a percentage of expenditures (Table 7, bottom panel).  The reason
is that even though  the poor spend a larger fraction  of their income on utilities than do the rich, even an excise
tax on oil ends up raising the prices for almost all goods, including those (primarily services) consumed
intensively by the rich. The net effect of the excise tax reveals a burden that rises with income.
If these effective excise tax rates are compared with measured income, then the pattern is mildly
regressive--but  only because  the poor consume  a larger fraction of their income than do the rich.  Also at issue
is whether the data on expenditures are more reliable than those on income (both are from the FIES).  There
is some reason to believe that expenditure data are underreported in the FIES, and more so for the upper
income brackets.  In this case, the regressivity picked up in the last column of Table 7 would be dampened.
Furthermore,  expenditures may be a better proxy  for permanent income, which should be the base for
incidence calculations anyway.  However, given that we used income as a base to calculate the burden of
income taxes, we continue using the same base to calculate the incidence of indirect taxes, thus permitting
aggregation across taxes.
12Table  7.  Excise  Tax  Rate
Effective  Excise  Tax Rates
Partial equilibrium  General equilibrium
Food  0  0.004
Alcohol  0.034  0.05
Tobacco  0.034  0.05
Fuel, light, water  0.025  0.0784
Transportation  &  0  0.04
Communication
Household  OPS  0  0.018
Personal  care  0  0.018
Clothing  and footwear  0.034  0.05
Education  0  0.018
Recreation  0  0.018
Medical  0  0.018
Nondurable  furniture  0.034  0.05
Durable  furniture  0.012  0.03
Rent  0  0.018
Maintenance  0  0.025
Table 7.  Excise Tax Rate (continued)
Effective  Excise  Tax Rates by Decile
Decile  Tax as %  of expenditure  Mean expenditure  Mean income  Tax as % of income
I  0.050  8904  8581  0.052
II  ~~~~0.051  12913  12866  0.052
III  ~~~~0.053  15858  16398  0.051
IV  0.054  18793  20179  0.051
V  0.056  22104  24329  0.050
VI  0.057  26172  29460  0.050
VII  0.058  31616  36482  0.050
Vill  0.060  39056  46774  0.050
IX  0.061  52209  64607  0.050
X  0.071  97580  144805  0.048
13Import tariffs.  As with excise taxes, and for the reasons cited earlier,  the partial- and general-
equilibrium  import tariff rates diverge quite markedly (Table 8).  On the one hand, the effective tariff rate on
utilities  doubles when general-equilibrium  effects are incorporated, because the utility sector contains both oil
(a tradable)  and water and electricity (nontradables).  Thus, the direct tariff payments of this sector are
relatively  small. Yet, even the nontradable  parts of this sector consume oil, so that the cascading effect of the
oil tariff is quite large.  On the other hand, the effective general-equilibrium tariff on clothing and footwear
is about one-third its partial-equilibrium value, given the imperfect substitutability between imported and
domestic clothes and shoes in the Philippines.
The net result is an incidence pattern that is neutral when taken as a fraction of expenditures, and
regressive as a fraction of income--the latter for the reason mentioned earlier.
Table 8.  Import Tariff Rates
Effective huport Tariff Rates
Partial equilibrium  General equilibrium
Food  0.126  0.073
Alcohol  0.295  0.109
Tobacco  0.295  0.109
Fuel, light, water  0.0476  0.0952
Transportation/  0  0.092
Communication
Household  OPS  0  0.084
Personal  care  0  0.084
Clothing  and footwear  0.295  0.109
Education  0  0.084
Recreation  0  0.084
Medical  0  0.084
Nondurable  furniture  0.295  0.109
Durable  furniture  0.146  0.1
Rent  0  0.084
Maintenance  0  0.095
14Table 8.  Import Tariff Rates (continued)
Effective Import Tariff Rates by Decile
Decile  Tax as % of expenditure  Tax as % of income
I  0.115  0.119
II  0.116  0.116
III  0.117  0.113
IV  0.118  0.110
V  0.119  0.108
VI  0.120  0.107
Vll  0.121  0.105
Vlll  0.122  0.102
ix  0.124  0.100
X  0.132  0.089
Table 9.  Value Added Taxes
Effective VAT Rates
Partial equilibrium  General equilibrium
Food  0  0.013
Alcohol  0.039  0.033
Tobacco  0.039  0.033
Fuel, light, water  0  0.0086
Transportation/  0  0.017
Conmnunication
Household  OPS  0  0.015
Personal  care  0  0.015
Clothing  and footwear  0.039  0.033
Education  0  0.015
Recreation  0  0.015
Medical  0  0.015
Nondurable  furniture  0.039  0.033
Durable  furniture  0.039  0.029
Rent  0  0.015
Maintenance  0.039  0.04
15Table 9.  Value Added Taxes (continued)
Effective VAT Rates by Decile
Decile  Tax as % of expenditure  Tax as % of income
1  0.037  0.038
II  0.037  0.037
III  0.038  0.037
IV  0.040  0.037
V  0.040  0.036
VI  0.041  0.036
VII  0.042  0.036
VIII  0.042  0.035
IX  0.043  0.035
X  0.049  0.033
Value added tax.  Although the value added tax (VAT) in the Philippines is based on the rebate
method, data on the rebates paid out are unavailable.  Therefore, the VAT is simulated here as a tax on the
fuial consumption  of the commodities  (primarily  consumer  goods). The result is a dilution of the tax rate when
its effects on prices are simulated  (Table 9, panel 1).  The incidence effects of this tax are practically neutral,
except when the income-expenditure  differential across deciles is taken into account.  In this case, the tax is
regressive, but not greatly so.
In sum, we find that the overall burden of indirect taxes in the Philippines falls more or less
equally on the poor and the rich.  This is true for total indirect taxes and for each of the components.  The
net result of the analysis of import tariffs and the VAT is an incidence pattern that is neutral when taken as
a fraction of expenditures, and regressive as a fraction of income--the latter for the statistical reasons
mentioned earlier.  This finding is in sharp contrast to earlier estimates of the indirect-tax burden in the
country (see, for example, World Bank, 1986) which concluded that the system was quite regressive.
However, these earlier analyses did not examine the general equilibrium effects of indirect taxes.  In fact,
our results dispute some recent work on tax incidence in the Philippines (Corcoran 1991 and Manasan
1991)  which, while conceding that the system is less regressive than in the past, still point to the regressive
16nature of indirect taxes.  Again, neither of these studies examines general-equilibrium effects which, as we
showed, play a crucial role in dampening the regressivity of indirect taxes in the Philippines.
Consolidation
Table  10 presents the consolidated tax burden in the Philippines.  Overall, the system is largely
neutral, with all deciles  effectively  paying about 10 percent of their income in taxes.  On the one hand, based
on reported incomes by decile, the slightly regressive nature of the indirect taxes is sufficient to render the
overall system mildly regressive, despite the progressive nature of direct taxes.  The primary reason for its
regressivity is the overwhelming inportance of indirect taxes in the Philippine economy.  But the difference
in the tax rate paid by the highest  and by the lowest deciles is just more than 1 percentage point.  On the other
hand, most of the regressivity  in indirect  taxes stems from the statistical divergence between expenditures and
income that varies implausibly  across deciles.  Thus, if in defining tax incidence we used expenditures rather
than income as our base for calculating  burden, the indirect-tax pattern would be almost neutral, rendering the
overall system progressive (Table 10, bottom panel).
Table 10.  Distribution of Tax Burden
Income-Based
Decile  Income  Business  Excise  Tariffs  VAT  Total
I  0  0  0.052  0.119  0.038  0.208
11  0  0  0.052  0.116  0.037  0.205
III  0  0  0.051  0.113  0.037  0.201
IV  0.002  0  0.051  0.110  0.037  0.200
V  0.003  0  0.050  0.108  0.036  0.198
VI  0.006  0  0.050  0.107  0.036  0.199
VII  0.010  0  0.050  0.105  0.036  0.201
Vill  0.010  0  0.050  0.102  0.035  0.197
IX  0.012  0.001  0.050  0.100  0.035  0.197
X  0.025  0.002  0.048  0.089  0.033  0.196
17Table 10.  Distribution of Tax Burden
Expenditure-Based
Decile  Income  Business  Excise  Tariffs  VAT  Total
I  0  0  0.050  0.115  0.037  0.200
II  0  0  0.051  0.116  0.037  0.204
III  0  0  0.053  0.117  0.038  0.208
IV  0.002  0  0.054  0.118  0.040  0.215
V  0.003  0  0.056  0.119  0.040  0.218
VI  0.007  0  0.057  0.120  0.041  0.224
VII  0.012  0  0.058  0.121  0.042  0.232
VIII  0.012  0  0.060  0.122  0.042  0.236
IX  0.015  0.001  0.061  0.124  0.043  0.244
X  0.037  0.002  0.071  0.132  0.049  0.291
Public Expenditures
We now turn to the expenditure side of the ledger.  As stated in the introduction, we focus on three
components of the budget that have strong distributional effects:  health, education, and  infrastructure.
Together,  these account  for about 30 percent of government expenditures, or 6 percent of GDP.  In a country
such as the Philippines,  where health and education  are provided overwhelmingly by the private sector, public
expenditures in these two sectors will be targeted particularly at alleviating poverty.  Moreover,  while
infrastructure expenditures are  typically meant to release supply bottlenecks, they  could have important
distributional  consequences  in the Philippines, where the rural infrastructure is particularly weak, and where
the majority of the poor live in rural areas.
Returning  to the general case in which we use regional expenditure data to derive benefit incidence,
we can infer for each expenditure category the implicit subsidy (expenditures per household as a fraction of
average household income) that is associated with each of the 10 nationwide deciles in each region.  The
overall  incidence of public expenditures in health, education, and infrastructure is a weighted average of the
regional incidence, the weights being the regional allocations of these expenditures.
18Table  11.  Public Expenditures  by Region
(in thousands of 1988 pesos)
Region  Health  Education  Infrastructure
NCR  148063  1685286  4093987
I  321047  686088  611187
II  215251  1251118  977986
III  402220  1818392  1214689
IV  603226  1079836  1791055
V  339864  1525578  885829
VI  339559  921344  783604
VII  319439  922158  668269
VIII  315742  736527  899791
IX  228044  765839  310566
X  285925  814766  629805
xi  278104  719522  673637
XII  178975  28712  303910
CAR  221947  191455  341923
Source:  Budget  Division,  FMS.
Table 12 shows the incidence pattern across deciles as implied by this method of allocating public
expenditures. The picture is clear: public expenditures have a beneficial effect on the distribution of income.
Indeed,  the pattern is strongly progressive, with the lowest decile receiving almost half of their income in
benefits,  and with the top 10 percent receiving virtually nothing.  Of course, it should be noted that this result
stems directly from our assumption that the benefits from expenditures in any  region accrue uniformly
throughout that region.  It follows that the benefits would comprise a much higher fraction of the income of
the lowest  decile than of the highest  decile.  However, another reason is that public expenditures appear to be
concentrated  in regions  that have a large share of the nation's poor.  For example, in Region V (Bicol), some
of the highest  shares  of  its population  fall in the nation's lowest decile, yet the region receives the third highest
amount  of expenditures  on education and the fourth highest on infrastructure.  Similarly, another region with
a concentration of the nation's poor,  Region IV (Southern Tagalog), receives the sixth highest amount of
educational  expenditures  and the second highest infrastructural expenditure. Meanwhile, the National Capital
19Region, which has the largest share of its population in the top decile, receives a large absolute amount of
infrastructure  and other spending, but, because it is also the most populous, has among the lowest per capita
spending.
Table 12.  Incidence of Public Expenditures
(benefits  as a share of gross  income)
Decile  Health  Education  Infrastructure
I  0.073  0.209  0.187
II  0.035  0.1  0.087
III  0.028  0.078  0.069
IV  0.023  0.062  0.059
V  0.02  0.051  0.051
VI  0.017  0.041  0.044
VII  0.015  0.034  0.038
VIII  0.012  0.025  0.032
IX  0.009  0.018  0.024
X  0.0002  0.0004  0.0005
Source: Authors'  calculations.
As mentioned  earlier, these calculations  make no allowance  for differences in utilization rates of these
public  services across income groups.  Yet there  is some evidence that in the Philippines the poor use
educational  services less  (on a proportional  basis)  than do the rich (World Bank 1986). We now examine how
this information  modifies  the incidence  pattern  derived  above. (The  only source  of data on utilization  rates
by deciles  is the 1982-83  Household  and School  Matching  Survey, which  lists enrollment  rates by different
age  and income  groups,  as shown  in Table 13). We combine  these  utilization  data with data on total (that  is,
current and capital) expenditures  on primary and secondary  education  to estimate the extent to which
considerations  of utilization  rates modify  our conclusions  about  the incidence  of expenditures. The regional
pattern  of expenditures  on primary  and secondary  education  is provided  in Table 14.
20Table 13.  Enrollment  Rates by Age and Income Decile
Decile  Ages 7-10  Ages 11-12  Ages 13-14  Ages 15-16  Total
I  0.971  0.905  0.663  0.537  0.774
II  0.951  0.890  0.704  0.496  0.758
III  0.960  0.892  0.697  0.506  0.767
IV  0.978  0.933  0.771  0.603  0.822
V  0.984  0.945  0.881  0.646  0.866
VI  0.974  0.939  0.851  0.701  0.868
VII  0.990  0.938  0.833  0.727  0.875
VIII  0.990  0.968  0.885  0.693  0.886
IX  0.990  0.981  0.939  0.802  0.926
X  0.994  0.963  0.894  0.864  0.928
Source:  World  Bank, 1986.3
Table  14.  Public Expenditures  on Education,  1990
(in millions of 1990 pesos)
Region  Elementary  Secondary
NCR  1323.9  933.4
I  807.6  465.7
II  492.8  341.7
III  1118.4  494.1
IV  1709.5  620.9
v  944.2  390.5
VI  1192.5  808.0
VII  930.4  208.1
VIII  762.2  391.0
IX  706.7  216.4
X  786.9  283.9
XI  834.0  264.6
XII  737.4  208.7
CAR  283.0  165.7
Source:  Budget  Division,  FMS.
The original  table  reported  enrollment  rates  by urban  and rural deciles. The table here is a weighted  average  of
those rates,  based  on weights  from  the 1988  FIES.
21The regional  distribution alone implies a particular incidence pattern  for the benefits of public
expenditures  on primary  and secondary education.  This pattern, which is calculated on the basis of the
regional income distribution data provided in Table 12, is provided in column 2 of Table 15.  The next two
columns show how this structure changes when utilization rates are taken into account.  The first of the two
columns combines the utilization rates in Table 13 for primary and secondary education.  The second is
derived from the fact  that the decile-specific  utilization  rates differ between primary and secondary education--
in particular, the lower utilization  rates among poorer people is much more pronounced in secondary education
than in primary.
Table 15.  Benefit Incidence Based on Utilization Rates
(as a share of gross income)
No Adjustment  Adjustment based on  Adjustment based on different
Decile  average utilization rates  primary/secondary utilization rates
I  .325  .252  .289
II  .139  .105  .121
III  .109  .083  .096
IV  .089  .073  .081
V  .072  .063  .068
VI  .059  .052  .055
VII  .047  .041  .044
VIII  .036  .032  .034
IX  .026  .024  .025
X  .0005  .0005  .0005
Source:  Autior's calculations.
Not surprisingly,  the incorporation of utilization rates dampens the progressive nature of educational
benefits.  However, the pattern is still strongly pro-poor, with the lowest decile receiving about a quarter of
their income in benefits,  and with the highest  receiving  nothing. Furthermore, insofar as primary expenditures
22are  the major redistributive element, and since primary utilization rates are more or less uniform across
deciles, the resulting pattern is only slightly modified in the absence of utilization rates.
It is instructive to compare our estimates of the distribution of education and health expenditures in
the Philippines  with those obtained  by van de Walle (1992) for the same two sectors in Indonesia.  Indonesia's
per capita income and stage  of economic  development  are roughly similar to those of the Philippines; both are
archipelagic nations; and the two countries have often been listed together as among the next generation of
potential East Asian "tigers."  Unlike our study, however, van de Walle's benefit incidence analysis draws
heavily on access to public  services and utilization  rates.  Hence, the two measures are not equivalent, but van
de Walle' s estimates come closest to providing us with an international comparison.
Table 16.  Incidence of Educational and Health Expenditures in Indonesia
(as a percent of per capita household expenditures)
Decile  Education  Health
1  .19  .007
II  .16  .007
III  .14  .005
IV  .13  .006
V  .07  .006
VI  .07  .006
VII  .06  .007
Viii  .05  .006
IX  .04  .005
X  .03  .003
Source: van de Walle  (1992).
The distribution  of educational  benefits in Indonesia closely mirrors the progressive pattern found in
the Philippines. The incidence  of health  benefits  is somewhat  less progressive than in the Philippines, although
health expenditures in the Philippines, too, are distributed more neutrally than are educational expenditures
23(see  Table  12). Van de Walle  attributes  the lack of progressivity  in health  expenditures  in Indonesia  to poor
targeting--something  that could  be discerned  only with data on access  to public  services  by different  income
groups. To the extent that targeting  may also be poor in the Philippines,  our conclusion  about  progressive
health expenditures  should  be qualified.
IV. Conclusions
In Table 17, we present  the combined  incidence  of taxes  and public  expenditures  in the Philippines.
While  this  is nothing  more  than  a consolidation  of Tables 10  and 12, it tells a somewhat  surprising  story. The
incidence pattern of taxes is basically  neutral; it is the pattern of expenditures  that drives the combined
incidence,  which  is progressive.
Table 17. Net Incidence  of Taxes and Public Expenditures
Income-Based
Decile  Taxes  Expenditures  Net Incidence
I  0.208  0.469  -0.261
II  0.205  0.222  -0.017
m  0.201  0.175  0.026
IV  0.200  0.144  0.056
V  0.198  0.122  0.076
VI  0.199  0.102  0.097
VII  0.201  0.087  0.114
vm  0.197  0.069  0.128
IX  0.197  0.051  0.146
X  0.196  0.0011  0.195
While we made numerous assumptions  in reaching this conclusion, it is hard to imagine that a further
refinement  of the data would reverse the pattern discerned here.  The neutrality of taxes stems from the fact
that  indirect  taxes  are  only slightly  regressive,  something  that cuts against  the grain of previous  studies  of the
24Philippines and elsewhere.  The reason for this result is the simple but little-noted fact that while the poor
consume taxed  goods (like  energy) directly, the rich consume them indirectly through their purchases of goods
that require energy and other taxed goods in their production.
Our assumptions were particularly heroic  on the expenditure side, where  we used the regional
distribution  of public  spending  to infer the incidence of benefits.  This was necessitated by our lack of data on
access to public services  by income groups.  However, in one case for which we had such data--primary and
secondary education--the incorporation of utilization rates into the analysis dampens the progressivity of
expenditures, but only slightly.
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